LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Volume 20, No.2 - Summer 1974
Editors of this issue: Thomas Remeikis
Copyright © 1974 LITUANUS Foundation, Inc.
MILITARY POLICIES AND PLANS OF THE BALTIC STATES ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
San Jose State University
A vertical* string of nations from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas in the south, from Finland down to the Balkan Peninsula, forms a peculiar zone in Europe which separates Russia from Western Europe and has played an important role in the development of world history during the last few centuries. From Finland to Poland this zone consists of a chain of small nations all bordering on the Baltic Sea in the west and Russia in the east. Finland in the north is attached to the Scandinavian Peninsula and is separated from the Baltic countries to the south by the Gulf of Finland. Because of her peculiar geographical position and past historical ties, Finland is often considered as a part of the Scandinavian bloc. The Gulf of Bothnia separates Finland, however, from most of Sweden, and the Finnish nation is racially and linguistically related to the Estonian nation to the south. Moreover, from 1809 to 1917 Finland was part of the Russian empire.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania form a common distinct area, often referred to as the Baltic or Eastern Baltic area. Geographically a part of the Great Russian Plain, these countries are oriented toward the Baltic Sea, however, and separated from Russia by a chain of Estonian lakes, several rivers, swamps and forested ranges of hills. Measuring roughly 400 by 250 miles, the combined area of the Baltic countries (65,237 sq. mi.), without the territory of Vilnius (Wilno), from 1920 to 1939 was larger in size than that of England and Wales combined or approximately one third of the pre-war Germany or half of that of Japan or California. The area was thinly populated, however, with a total of less than 6 million inhabitants, the bulk of its population being formed by three different nationalities — the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians.
South of the Baltic republics the peculiar north-south zone widened and became less vulnerable in prewar Poland, which was the geographical center of the entire zone. Together with the Baltic States, particularly Lithuania, Poland formed a barrier and a bridge between Russia and Germany. Because of its geographical position, Poland was only partly a Baltic state, but predominantly a Central-Eastern European power. To the south, west and east of Poland the zone widens even more and is composed of a cluster of mostly Slavic nations affected in the west by direct influences from Germany and Italy, and overshadowed in the east by their huge Russian neighbor. While all the nations to the north of Poland are non-Slavic, in the south only the Greeks, Rumanians, Albanians and Hungarians are non-Slavs.
Two world wars have been ignited in this zone — the first one at Sarajevo, and the second one at Danzig. Whenever one of the great horizontal powers in Europe — Russia or Germany — had been in possession of portions of the narrow vertical zone, the expansionist greed has become so great that the peace of the entire world has been threatened. The Baltic countries have usually been in the key position in this power play. 1000 miles of seacoast and excellent, sheltered harbors have always played an important role in the history of the Baltic countries. The Baltic area has always served as an important link between continental Europe and the Atlantic Ocean, and the Baltic countries form the most convenient meeting ground between the maritime and the continental parts of Europe. Many wars have been fought in the Baltic area for supremacy over the Baltic Sea. The neutralization of the Baltic area has never been seriously attempted, but in the period from 1721 to 1795 all Baltic lands, with the exception of a small stretch in East Prussia, were absorbed by the Russian Empire, which thus had enlarged its window to the Baltic Sea.
The landscape of the Baltic countries is largely flat, although they possess hills rising to a maximum height of 1000 feet. There are also hundreds of lakes, some of which are of considerable size (Lake Peipsi —1400 sq. mi.). Each country is served by several large rivers of which the most important ones are the Daugava (Dwina) in Latvia, the Nemunas (Niemen) in Lithuania and the Narva in Estonia. There are also many marshes, sandy plains and forests, but certain areas possess rich soils. The Estonian soil contains considerable quantities of oil shale (5.5 bill. tons), which produce machine oils and gasoline. The forests, covering more than one-fifth of the Baltic territory, are of great importance in industry and building and as fuel reserve. The 3.5 bill. tons of peat are also of considerable importance. The water power especially in Latvia is also a great natural gift, providing approx. 2 mill. kW of energy.1
Because of its geographical position, excellent harbors and considerable lack of land barriers, with the exception of the Estonian chain of lakes on the Russian border (Peipsi and Pskov), the Estonian archipelago, and the Daugava, Dubysa and Nemunas rivers in Latvia and Lithuania, the Baltic area has always been a convenient gateway, especially in East - West traffic. For the same reasons the Baltic area has also been considered as a convenient battleground when its neighbors, particularly the great powers — Russia and Germany — to the east and west have chosen to engage in annexationist policies. For the same reasons the Baltic nations have found it very difficult to defend their countries against the predatory schemes of their great neighbors.
The Baltic republics had come into this world as more or less unwanted children. The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the propaganda declarations for self-determination of nations issued by Soviet Russian as well as British, American and French governments, and the attempts of the Western allies to undermine German positions in Baltic territories, conquered during the war, had facilitated the proclamation of independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.2 The Baltic leaders soon found out, however, that the rights of self-determination of nations were not meant to be binding for the Baltic nations or, for that matter, for any one of the nations under British, Russian, French or American domination. The Baltic states were supposed to revert to "a non-communist Russia."3 Lithuania was given the option to join Poland if she so desired.4 A variety of insincere arguments were raised against financial, military and diplomatic assistance to them in Western capitals. However, the Baltic States proved that they were national states with ancient cultures and unusually high educational levels and strictly defined boundaries, that they were, in regard to territory and population, large enough and able to sustain themselves economically, and willing to maintain democratic regimes with ample provisions for the protection and well-being of their minorities, something they themselves had never enjoyed under Russian and German control.5 The bubble burst with the end of the Russian civil war and the Communist victory. The world had to reckon with the Baltic States which had survived almost miraculously.6
The Baltic States were primarily agricultural, and depended also to a large extent on the large reserves of timber which they each possessed. Latvia and Estonia also contained large seaports and well developed industry. Both of these countries, though equipped by their natural positions and by their extensive industrial apparatus to become important manufacturing centers, lacked the capital and the markets necessary to bring such an aim within the realm of practical politics. Moreover, in all three countries, the actual devastation caused by World War I and its aftermath — the Russian Civil War and their Wars of Liberation — was considerable, and the demands of reconstruction were great. In addition, there were numerous other difficulties which hindered the reorganization of their economic system. One of them was caused by the agrarian reform and the splitting up of the large estates of the Baltic German, Lithuanian-Polish and Russian nobles. A further serious problem was that of communications, for the railways and highways built in the time of the Russian Empire bore little relation to the needs of the three national Baltic states, particularly Lithuania. This country was also somewhat impeded in her work of economic construction by the persistence of the Vilnius (Wilno) dispute with Poland, her most important neighbor. The process of reconstruction and fundamental adjustment to the new conditions both inside and outside of the Baltic was highly successful, and the Baltic States were able to look to their future in confidence as early as 1933.7
The Baltic countries were surrounded on land by three aggressive neighbors — Russia, Poland, and Germany. Poland was internally weak, however, and could also be considered as a potential ally against the other two neighbors due to her territorial disputes with both of them. It was also true that the two gigantic and potentially dangerous neighbors of the Baltic States — Russia and Germany — were made temporarily impotent after World War I, but nobody could seriously consider that these inherently strong powers would remain weak for a long time. The Baltic States found themselves in a situation which is somewhat similar to the one modern Israel faces today. The analogy is not fully fitting, however. While Israel has been able to muster massive assistance of the world Jewish community and considerable public support in western world, the Baltic States received no significant assistance from abroad.
During their brief tenure as independent states the Baltic countries tried hard to serve as a pacifying and stabilizing factor in the turbulent region of Central and Eastern Europe. They subscribed to all schemes and proposals aimed at the maintenance of peace. From the beginning the Baltic States placed great hopes in the newly created League of Nations, without at first realizing that the League was to become a vehicle for furthering the conflicting interests of the Great Powers without much regard for the smaller and weaker countries. The delegates of the Baltic States were active in and out of the League of Nations, subscribing to all plans and conventions which intended to maintain the status quo and keep the world out of the war. They got little in return but disappointments. General proposals for disarmament and the abolition of war were killed outright or made ineffectual. Schemes for regional areas of security, termed Eastern Locarno or Northern Locarno, actively supported by the Baltic States, could not be materialized due to the unwillingness of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union to subscribe to them and the hesitation of France and Great Britain to support them.8 By the late 1930's the Baltic nations had lost confidence in the League of Nations and the western democracies. In October, 1935, Latvia was given a seat in the Council of the League and in 1938 Latvian Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters even served as its President,9 but in the same year, after having watched the complete sterility of the League of Nations, the Baltic nations proclaimed their absolute neutrality in any future war and declared they would no longer be bound by the special obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant which committed members of the League to come to the assistance of other member nations who were victims of aggression.10
The Baltic States always felt the awesome presence of the Soviet Russian giant from whose clutches they had recently liberated themselves. They also had the uneasy feeling that they had been left more or less on their own by their former supporters in their War of Liberation — Great Britain and France. They realized that the Soviet Union played a double role by outwardly maintaining normal relations with the Baltic "bourgeois" republics and secretly organizing a Baltic communist underground, which was quite negligible, however. Short of losing their independence, the Baltic States tried to do their best to please their eastern neighbor. They avoided involvement in any possibly anti-Soviet plots or alliances. They made their ports and railways available to Soviet authorities at the lowest possible rates for use in Soviet transit.11 They were willing to sign nonaggression and even disarmament treaties with the Soviet Union if the Soviet terms were reasonable. As it turned out, the Soviets visualized full disarmament of the Baltic countries and partial disarmament of Soviet Union, non-recognition of international arbitration, and severance of the Baltic states from the "unholy" League of Nations.12 This, of course, would have amounted to voluntary suicide of the Baltic states. The Baltic nations signed the so-called Litvinov Protocol in 192913 ratifying the Kellogg - Briand Pact which outlawed wars, they signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 193214 and extended it for ten more years in 1934.15
Until 1934, the Soviet Union was opposed to any sort of alliances between the Baltic States, especially in league with Poland. From 1934 to 1939 the Soviets were no longer opposed to a Baltic Entente, if it could be turned against Nazi Germany, and they were willing to sponsor treaties guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic States with or without their acceptance, on condition that the Soviet Union would decide when those states were threatened and might protect them with or without their permission.16 The Baltic States were unwilling to allow Soviet troops on their soil in anticipation that the Soviets would never leave them again. Poland, Germany, France and Great Britain also turned down Soviet proposals on these terms.17
The Baltic military planners seriously considered the possibility of a Soviet invasion of their countries. Therefore, they concentrated most of their armed forces in the east. Lithuania had no common boundary with the Soviet Union until the collapse of Poland, but Estonia and Latvia had a long boundary with the Soviet Union (370 miles) and even longer unprotected seacoasts. With the small armed forces at their disposal, they could possibly detain the Soviet troops for only a short time in the hope that Poland and some Western powers would come to their rescue. After the collapse of Poland that hope, too, was gone.
The German Weimar Republic had given up the idea of dominating the Baltic countries, but the German politicians preferred an unsettled situation in the entire area of Eastern Europe in order to recover at a proper moment former territories lost to Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Powerful German economic groups also viewed the entire Baltic bloc as an unwelcome barrier between Germany and Russia.18 They desired to trade directly with the Russians without Baltic middlemen. On January 12, 1927, Germany adopted a categorical stand against any kind of Finno - Baltic alliance. She considered the Baltic states as properly belonging to the Soviet sphere of interest.19 By utilizing all sorts of legal and semi-legal means Germany made the position of Lithuania in the autonomous Klaipeda (Memel) Territory as unpleasant and insecure as possible. At the same time Germany tried to maintain Lithuania as a pawn against Poland and to utilize her conflict over the ownership of Vilnius to the utmost, short of direct involvement on the side of Lithuania, however, and also short of a Lithuanian - Polish war. In this policy Germany was seconded and actively supported by the Soviet Union.20
The German - Soviet policy of rapprochement following the treaties of Rapallo in 1922 and Berlin in 1926 worried the Baltic States.21 At the time when this policy was in force, the Baltic States could still count on the support from the League of Nations and Western Powers. When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the Baltic States viewed the new development with mixed feelings. They were genuinely afraid of possible Nazi aggression, and Nazi philosophy was obnoxious to them. Their only consolation, however, was the supposedly irreconcilable difference between the Nazis and Communists. As long as both movements remained antagonistic to each other and about equal in strength, the Baltic States could feel relatively secure.22 After the Germans took over Klaipeda Territory from Lithuania on March 23, 1939, the Nazi German Government declared its intention to sign non-aggression treaties with the Baltic States. As these states had already signed a similar treaty with the other potential aggressor, Soviet Union, Estonia and Latvia signed such a treaty with Germany on June 7, 1939. A similar agreement between Lithuania and Germany was signed at the time of Klaipeda's takeover by the Nazis.23 A policy of nonaggression had fit into the policy of absolute neutrality of the Baltic States.
For a long time the Baltic States had counted on the assistance of Western Powers. Great Britain had been the first country which had extended recognition to Estonia and Latvia. Mainly thanks to considerable assistance rendered by the British Navy, and several loans and shipments of weapons from Great Britain, the Baltic States had won their War of Liberation. From the British warships and their complements ultimately sprang the high prestige which England enjoyed throughout the Baltic countries from 1918 to 1939.24 The British policy regarding the Baltic States can be considered as benevolent. The British proposed a Scandinavian - Baltic alliance, or at least a Baltic alliance, and were greatly annoyed when these proposals did not materialize due to the Scandinavian self-imposed isolation and the Lithuanian - Polish dispute which prevented closer relations not only between these two countries, but also between them and the other Baltic countries and Finland.25 When the Baltic States felt threatened by the Soviet armies in 1923 and again in 1924, the British did not send their navy to the Baltic when requested, but sold them large quantities of mostly antiquated weapons at high prices.26 The Baltic governments and peoples desperately looked to Great Britain as their principal defender and supporter. They did not know that as early as November 3, 1923,27 the British government had made a decision, reconfirmed on February 6, 1925, and April 10, 1926, that apart from obligations which would arise under the Covenant of League of Nations, Great Britain would not feel called upon to object to any change such as the federation of the Baltic States, or even their absorption by Russia. The British were too preoccupied with the matters of their empire in the Mediterranean and the Far East to pay much attention to the Baltic matters.28 The Baltic leaders understood the meaning of the British - German arid British - Soviet naval agreements in 1935 and 1936.29 They looked to them as if the British were interested in seeing the totalitarian powers — Nazi Germany and Soviet Union — involved in a mortal combat which could avoid the possible collapse of democracy in the world.
The Baltic leaders also realized that France wanted to utilize the vacuum created by the downfall of Germany and to become the leading power in Europe. They also knew that she was opposed in this design by Great Britain. In order to offset the loss of Russia as an ally east of Germany, France sponsored an enlarged Poland to replace it. On February 19, 1921, she signed a military alliance with Poland.30 France attempted to encourage the Baltic States and Finland to join Poland in a military alliance in order to strengthen her own position in regard to Germany and Soviet Union.31 The French also sold some weapons to the Baltic countries, particularly to Latvia. The Latvian navy was equipped with modern French submarines and minelayers.32
Being the strongest and largest of all the countries that sprung into existence between Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland naturally attempted to unite all of them under her leadership. The domineering attitude and even arrogance displayed by some of the Polish leaders annoyed the other states, however. Poland's territorial demands on Latvia and Czechoslovakia and her designs to annex all of Lithuania or at least the eastern and southern portions of her further alienated the neighbors of Poland. The Polish occupation of the ancient Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on October 9, 1920, and its annexation by Poland caused an irreparable damage in the relations between that country and her northern neighbors. Lithuania proclaimed a state of war and broke off her relations with Poland.33 This situation continued until March 17, 1938, when Lithuania was forced to normalize her relations with Poland following a Polish ultimatum.34 The Lithuanian - Polish conflict was most embarrassing to the other Baltic countries, especially to Latvia. After a series of conferences, Finland and Latvia refused to enter an alliance with Poland before the settlement of the Polish - Lithuanian conflict to the mutual satisfaction of both of them.35 Polish-oriented Estonia went along rather unwillingly with them. Poland was generally considered by the Baltic countries as a security risk rather than a guarantor of peace. Finland and Latvia even suspected further Polish territorial designs toward Germany and Russia which could involve the Baltic States in another unnecessary war. German and Soviet diplomats also threatened the Baltic leaders with dire consequences if they were to form an alliance with Poland.36 There was cooperation, however, between Polish, Latvian, Estonian and sometimes also Rumanian and Finnish general staffs mainly on consultative basis.37 The Polish - German treaty of nonaggression of 193438 and Polish indirect participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia further alienated Poland from the Baltic countries.39 In 1939 the Baltic leaders considered Poland's fate to be sealed, but hoped that somehow their nations could escape a similar calamity.
Shortly before the war the total strength of the Baltic armies amounted to 4660 officers and up to 58,000 men, with about 900 guns, including 248 AA guns, 102 tanks, 30 armored cars, nine armored trains and two railroad batteries, up to 400 warplanes, engineering troops and signal battalions. The combined strength of the Baltic navies consisted of four submarines, one torpedo boat, cutters, seven icebreakers, five hydrographic service vessels, one submarine depot, six tenders, one tugboat and one yacht. The Border Guard units included 6000 men, the police 8300 men, and the Home Guard almost 200,000 men and women, with its own infantry, cavalry, motorized aviation and naval units.
Estonia had a relatively well developed industry, especially shipbuilding and machine industry. Latvia had highly developed electronics industry, facilities for shipbuilding and repairs, an automobile assembly plant, a budding aircraft industry, an ammunitions factory and an arsenal which produced light weapons, gas masks, etc. Lithuanian industry was in an early stage of development, but Lithuania also had an ammunition factory and she also produced good light aircraft. There was also an arsenal in Estonia. Most of the Estonian and Latvian weapons were antiquated, but the Lithuanian military technology was greatly modernized. The Estonian and Latvian training, however, was superior to that of Lithuania. The transportation system was most adequate in Latvia and least adequate in Lithuania.40
The Baltic armies cooperated only sporadically, and on a small scale, during their War of Liberation (1918 -1920). As early as January 6, 1920, the military representatives of the three Baltic republics agreed on the necessity of having a military alliance between their countries, but the Baltic political leaders missed the opportunity to realize the proposals.41 The Estonians and, to a certain extent, also the Latvians were unwilling to become involved in a possible Lithuanian - Polish or Lithuanian -German war over the possession of Vilnius or Klaipeda. Poland had been Latvia's official ally in her war against Soviet Russia42 and the strongest possible defender of the Baltic countries in case of a renewed Soviet invasion. On the other hand, Latvia, and, to a much lesser extent, Estonia were unwilling to sign a military alliance with Poland. They did not want to antagonize Lithuania and also considered Poland to be an unstable and weak country due to her huge and hostile minorities, her dangerously extended and insecure frontiers and her unfriendly relations with almost all of her neighbors.43
On July 7, 1921, Latvia and Estonia signed a military and political alliance,44 which was further extended on November 1, 1923,45 and February 17, 1934.46 Military cooperation between the two countries was not well developed, however. They never made an agreement about unified command, unified weapons systems, common armaments industry or even common command language. While the Latvian weapons were mostly of British origin and British ammunition was used, most of the Estonian weapons were of Russian and German origin and Russian ammunition was used, but most of the Lithuanian weapons were of German and French origin and German ammunition was used. During the war Latvia would be completely cut off from British sources of supplies, and the Baltic countries would not be able to help each other with ammunition and spare parts. Only Lithuania had bought some weapons from nearby Swedish armaments factories.47
Only in 1930 did the military leaders of Estonia and Latvia seriously discuss closer military cooperation, and only in 1931 common maneuvers of the Estonian and Latvian armed forces and navies were held.48 In the next years the Baltic countries exchanged only some information and a few officers. Their arsenals also produced small quantities of light weapons and weapons parts for their allies. The Baltic governments did not acquaint each other with their defense plans.49 The wartime strength of the Baltic armies was theoretically 650,000 men, but in practice only 360,000 men (100,000 in Estonia, 130,000 in Latvia and 130,000 in Lithuania),50 Their total mobilization could be effected within 72 hours. The Estonians would have eight brigades, the Latvians — eight divisions in two army groups, and the Lithuanians — five divisions and two cavalry brigades.51 The Estonian defense was based on the line of natural barriers in the east: Narva River - Lake Peipsi - Lake Pskov - swampy and wooded area of Lida and Vruda. The second line of defense was based on Piusa - Petseri - Pankjavitsa - Laura, and the last line around the Estonian capital Tallinn and on the Estonian islands. The principal defence line was fortified with 50 reinforced concrete bunkers. The Estonian military planners visualized possible cooperation with the Latvian and Finnish armed forces. The Gulf of Finland would be defended by minefields laid in the areas around Suursaar, Tütarsaar, and Lavansaar islands, and on Äigna - Porkkala line.52
The Latvian general staff had prepared three war plans: A — for the defence against the USSR, D — defence against Germany, and K — defence against both the USSR and Germany. Plan K was not seriously considered. Plan A visualized cooperation with the Estonian Army, but Plan D counted on possible cooperation with the Lithuanian Army. Plan A was most seriously considered and visualized a slow retreat to the main defence line: Pededze River — Lake Lubans — Aiviekste River in central Latvia, and a possible further retreat to the Dauguva line, which was also considered in the defence against Germany. Sea lanes to Riga and the vicinity of Riga, and possibly also Liepaja and Ventspils, would be mined. Weak land forces would defend the long coastline.53
Although the Lithuanian Government had repeatedly demanded restoration of the Vilnius territory from Poland, the Lithuanian armed forces had no offensive plans. The Lithuanian general staff had prepared only two defensive plans: one against possible Polish or Soviet invasion, and another one against German attack. In the first case the Lithuanian army would withdraw from the borders to the Kaunas - Neveþys line and from there to the Dubysa line. In case of a German offensive the Lithuanian army would retreat to the Dubysa line, which formed the principal line of defence and was fortified with reinforced concrete bunkers.54 The Latvian defense lines remained unfortified, however. By actualizing their plan of defense, the Latvian army would create a dangerous gap in the Estonian system of defense, while the Lithuanian army, retreating to its main line of defense, would open a dangerous gap. in the Latvian system of defense. The Baltic military planners had thought only about the defense of their own countries and not about common action against an intruder.
On September 12, 1934, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a treaty of diplomatic alliance, but a military alliance between the three countries was never concluded.55 The Commander of the Lithuanian army, Gen. Stasys Raðtikis, twice, in 1934, and again after the beginning of World War II, suggested a military alliance between all three Baltic republics, but the suggestion was turned down by the governments of all of these countries.56 The Baltic leaders were afraid that a military alliance might provoke the big neighbors of the Baltic republics to invade them. Poland was also adamantly opposed to any kind of military cooperation between Lithuania and her northern neighbors. Only after the Soviets had already created their military bases in the Baltic States, in October, 1939, did the Baltic leaders start to think seriously about military cooperation.57 It was already too late, however. The Soviets no longer wanted military cooperation among the Baltic States themselves.58
The Baltic States had formed an obstacle to aggressive tendencies of Soviet Union and Germany, which could easily drag the entire world into a devastating war. They did not receive economic and even moral assistance from the big powers when they needed it. They were left more or less to themselves and their strength was weakened by the internal interference of the Soviet Union and Germany. The coup of Vilnius engineered by Poland precluded any possibility of an effective security system of all states endangered by Soviet Union and Germany. The Soviets and Nazis did their utmost to remove the Baltic States as an obstacle on their way to expansion. Their partition of the Baltic States and Poland by treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939,59 was never expected, and left them completely defenseless. Western democracies had simply looked on the Baltic States without giving them practical assistance. The Baltic States were unable to form an effective alliance by themselves and could not stand up for long even united against the Soviet Union or Germany, or both. The Polish - Baltic barrier was removed by the joint effort of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. World War II, the most devastating war in history, resulted in part from the agreement that led to this partition. Today we find the Soviet armies in the middle of Europe, Germany divided and amputated, all Eastern Europe under Soviet domination and Western Europe, crippled and shorn of power, under the Soviet shadow.
* Paper delivered at the Conference on Baltic Area in World War II, Stanford University and San Jose State University, April 13-15, 1973.
1 Ethel Gertrude Woods, The Baltic Region, A Study in Physical and Human Geography (London: Methuden & Co., 1932), 1-39, 339-406; Edgar(s) Anderson(s), ed., Cross Road Country Latvia (Waverly, Iowa: Latvju Gramata, 1953), 12-63, 95-117, 358-67; Villibald Raud, Estonia, A Reference Book (New York: The Nordic Press, 1953), 33-36, 46-95; Anicetas Ðimutis, The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania After 1938 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 19-117.
2 Edgar Anderson, "Die baltische Frage und die internationale Politik der Alliierten und Assoziierten Mächte bis zum November 1918, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Loslösung der baltischen Provinzen von Russland und zur Entstehung der baltischen Staaten, eds. Hans von Rimscha, Arved Freiherr von Taube, Jürgen von Hehn (Marburg/Lahn: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1971), 255, 257-62, 264-66, 270-74.
3 Albert N. Tarulis, American - Baltic Relations 1918-1922: The Struggle Over Recognition (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 21-73.
4 This "option" was left only in 1918, but after the collapse of White Russian governments' certain French circles were again interested in a possible union between Poland and Lithuania.
5 Tarulis, passim.
6 The most valuable source is Malbone Watson Graham, Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States (Berkeley, California: Publications of the University of California at Los Angeles in Social Sciences, 1939-41)—all three volumes.
7 U. S. National Archives (N.A.), 860n.OO/69 — Frederick W. B. Coleman, May 21, 1928; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Second series 1929-1934, eds. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (hereafter cited as Brit. Doe.) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1946-58), VII, No. 629, 740.
8 Edgar Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union 1920 - 27," Lituanus, XII, No. 2 (Summer, 1966), 53-54; Edgar Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union, 1927 - 1934," Lituanus, XIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1967), 10.
9 Jûlijs Feldmaus, Rakstu krajums (Lincoln, Nebraska: Vaidava, 1963), 47-48; Briva Zeme, Nos. 231, 232, 233 (October 10, 11, 12, 1936) — on October 8, 1936, Latvia was elected as a member of the Council of the League of Nations for three years with 49 of the 52 counties casting positive votes and only two states opposing Latvia's election. From May 9 to 14, 1938, Munters presided over the 101st Session of the League Council — Robert E. Dell, The Geneva Racket 1920-1939 (London: Robert Dell, 1941), 136-40, 170-71; Vilhelms Munters, Pardomas (Riga: Latvijas valsts izdevnieciba, 1963), 60-61.
10 Boris Meissner, Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten und das Völkerrecht (Köln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956), 14-15 — Estonia adopted a law on neutrality on December 3, 1938, Latvia on December 21, 1938, and Lithuania on January 25, 1938; Evald Uustalu, The History of Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1952), 199 — the three Baltic states openly declared their neutrality at the General Assembly of the League of Nations as early as September 18, 1938.
11 Edgar Anderson, "The USSR Trades with Latvia: The Treaty of 1927," Slavic Review, XXI, No. 2 (June, 1962), 297-98, 309, 316-21.
12 Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918-1940 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 53-83.
13 Ibid., 78-79.
14 Ibid., 80-81.
15 Ibid., 87.
16 Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Archives of the German Foreign Ministry on Microfilm deposited in the National Archives of the United States (hereafter cited as A.A.), Microcopy T-120, Ser. 6603, Roll 3025, fr. E495323-24; Ser. 6611, R. 3073, E498135 (Dr. Georg Martius); Great Britain, Public Record Office (P.R.O.), F.O. 371 — 18231, N3658/13/59; N.A., R.G. 84, 7601.00/34; Latvia, Archives of the Latvian Legation in Stockholm (private copies of Minister Voldemars Salnais), Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, USA (hereafter cited as L.S.S.), Box 12, No. 1656/sl. (Dr. Alfreds Bilmanis, June 9, 1934); Vilnis Sipols, Dzimtenes nodeviba (Riga: Latvijas valsts izdevnieciba, 1963), 85-86.
17 Tarulis, Soviet Policy, 101-113.
18 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte (Berlin: 1871-1942), CCCXLVI, 19189; A.A., T-120, Ser. K 2331, R. 5770, K6637B3.
19 N.A., 860pOO/105; A.A., T-120, Ser. 4560, R. 2311, E154226; Ser. 5462, R. 2777, E374025-26.
20 A.A., T-120, Ser. 5462, R. 2779, E374974-76, February 14, 1927.
21 A.A., T-120, Ser. K 250, R. 3883, K076955-61; Ser. K 243, R. 3876, K072341-42.
22 Latvia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2. sûtnu konferences Riga, 1935. gada no 28. junija lidz 3. julijam seþu protokoli, The Library of San Jose State University, San Jose, California, USA, B. 500/35. 2898, nr. 8, 18-19, nr. 9, 4th Meeting, 24.
23 United States of America, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D: 1937 - 1945 (hereafter cited as Germ. Doc.) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953-60), V, 530-31; Latvian - Russian Relations, Documents, ed. Dr. Alfred Bilmanis (Washington, D.C.: The Latvian Legation, 1944), 190.
24 Edgar Anderson, "British Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918 - 1920," Journal of Central European Affairs, XIX, No. 3 (October, 1959), 288-89.
25 United States of America, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, 1918 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-32, 1937), III, 838-44.
26 P.R.O., P.O. 371 — 9273, November 3, 1923; 9274, N8704, N8712, N8927 N8694/59; 9253, N9400/M9800/39/59: L.S.S., Box. 3, No. 2498/sl., London; P.R.O., P.O. 371 — 10371, N8943, N9184, N332, N9151, N9324, N9504/619/59.
27 P.R.O., F.O. 371 — 9273, November 3, 1923.
28 Ibid., 10977, N675/112/59 (Sir Reginald Leeper's draft); Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series Ia (1925-1929) (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1966), 866 (John D. Gregory).
29 Latvia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2. sûtnu konference (2nd Conference of Envoys), 500/35 — 2898, No. 13, 1-2 spec.
30 James Thomson Shotwell and Max M. Laserson, Poland and Russia 1919-1945 (New York: Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), 21.
31 Vilnis Sipols, Slepena diplomatija (Riga: Liesma, 1965), 90-91; P.R.O., F.O. 371 — 9253, N9679, N9800, N9807/39/59; L.S.S., Box. 3, No. 3287/conf.; Box. 4, No. 1544 (May 11, 1933); No. 28/sl. (Nov. 30, 1934).
32 Edgar Anderson, "Die militärische Situation der baltischen Staaten," Acta Baltica, VIII (1968), 126-27.
33 Lithuania Under the Soviets, Portrait of a Nation 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 18, 39-40.
34 Ibid., 41.
35 Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union 1920 - 27," 37-50.
36 Edgar Anderson, "The Role of the Baltic States Between the USSR and Western Europe," East European Quarterly, VII, No. 4 (January, 1974), 388-89.
37 Anderson, "Die militärische Situation," 128-29.
38 L.S.S., Box 11, No. 6452.
39 Ibid., Box. 5, No. 178.
40 Anderson, "Die militärische Situation," 131-35, 138-41, 145-48; Jürg Meister, "Was kostet die Freiheit? Die Schicksal der baltischen Staaten als Warnung," Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Vol. 137, No. 12 (December, 1971), 872-73.
41 Edgar Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Entente — the Initial Phase," Pro Baltica. Mélanges dédiés à Kaarel R. Pusta, ed. Jüri G. Poska (Stockholm: Publication du Comité des amis de K. K. Pusta, 1965), 48.
42 Edgar(s) Anderson(s), Latvijas vesture 1914-1920 (Stockholm: Daugava, 1967), 568-75.
43 Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union 1920-27," 34, 38.
44 Ibid., 36-37.
45 Ibid., 42-44.
46 Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union, 1927 -1934," 21-22.
47 Anderson, "Die militärische Situation," 153-54.
48 Ibid., 150.
49 Ibid., 151-52.
50 Meister, 843-44; Anderson, "Die militärische Situation," 132, 142, 146.
52 Anderson, "Die militärische Situation," 142-44.
53 Ibid., 135-37.
54 Ibid., 148.
55 Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union, 1927 -1934," 26-28.
56 Gen. Stasys Raðtikis, Personal letters, April 12, 1959, January 4, 1963; Personal interview, June 12, 1959; Stasys Lozoraitis has also suggested a military alliance at the beginning of 1936, personal letter, January 5, 1959; N.A., R.G. 59, 760i. 60m/15
57 There was a meeting of the Estonian and Latvian Chiefs of Staffs on November 18-23, 1939, one between the Latvian and Lithuanian Chiefs of Staffs on November 21-23, 1939, and another one from November 29 to December 1, 1939, and still another one on December 16, 1939. On January 2, 1940, the Estonian Chief of Staff visited Riga, and the Latvian and Lithuanian military leaders visited Tallinn in February, 1940; there followed another meeting in Riga on March 14 -16, 1940.
58 The Latvian-Estonian military alliance was formally dissolved on June 29, 1940, and the Baltic Entente was annulled on July 1, 1940 — Latvijas PSR Zinatòu Akademijas Vestures instituts, Latvijas PSR Centralais valsts vestures archivs, Socielistiskas revolucijas uzvara Latvija 194O. gada (20.VI - 5.VIII), Dokumenti un materiali (Riga: Latvijas PSR Zinatnu akademijas izdevnieciba, 1963), 24-25.
59 Tarulis, Soviet Policy, 126-27, 139-41.